We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. We formulate a notion of incentive compatibility (IC) that we call support-based IC that is substantially more robust than Bayesian IC, and develop black-box reductions from support-based-IC mechanism design to algorithm design. For single-dimensional settings, this black-box reduction applies even when we only have an LP-relative approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem. Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for various covering settings, including single-dimensional covering problems, multi-item procurement auctions, and multidimensional facility location.
INTRODUCTION
In a covering mechanism-design problem, there are players who provide covering objects and a buyer who needs to obtain a suitable collection of objects so as to satisfy certain covering constraints (e.g., covering a ground set); each player incurs a certain private cost, which we refer to as his type, for providing his objects, and the mechanism must therefore pay the players from whom objects are procured. We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems (also called procurement auctions) in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is to minimize the expected total payment made by the mechanism. Consider support-based IC 1 that, while somewhat weaker than DSIC, is still substantially more robust than BIC and at the same time is flexible enough that it allows one to obtain various polytime near-optimal mechanisms satisfying this notion. A support-based-(IC, IR) mechanism (see Section 2) ensures that truthful participation in the mechanism is in the best interest of every player (i.e. a "no-regret" choice) for every type profile in a certain subset of the type space: for every player i, we impose the IC and IR conditions for all type profiles of the form (·, c −i ) for every profile c −i of other players' types coming from the support of the underlying distribution. In particular, a support-based-(IC, IR) mechanism ensures that truthful participation is the best choice for every player even at the ex-post stage when the other players' (randomly-chosen) types are revealed to him. Such a mechanism is significantly more robust than a (BIC, interim-IR) mechanism, since it retains its IC and IR properties for a large class of distributions that contains (in particular) every distribution whose support is a subset of the support of the actual distribution. In other words, in keeping with Wilson's doctrine of detail-free mechanisms, the mechanism functions robustly even under fairly limited information about the type-distribution.
We show that for a variety of settings, one can reduce the support-based-(IC, IR) payment-minimization (PayM) mechanism-design problem to the algorithmic costminimization (CM) problem of finding an outcome that minimizes the total cost incurred. Moreover, this black-box reduction applies to (a) single-dimensional settings even when we only have an LP-relative approximation algorithm for the CM problem (that is required to work only with nonnegative costs) (Theorem 4.2); and (b) multidimensional problems with additive types (Corollary 3.3).
Our reduction yields near-optimal support-based (IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanisms for a variety of covering settings, such as (a) various single-dimensional covering problems including single-item procurement auctions (Table I) ; (b) multi-item procurement auctions (Theorem 5.1); and (c) multidimensional facility location (Theorem 5.3). (Support-based IC-in-expectation means that the support-based-IC guarantee holds for the expected utility of a player, where the expectation is over the random coin tosses of the mechanism.) In Section 6, we consider some extensions involving both weaker (but more robust than (BIC, interim IR)) solution concepts and the stronger (DSIC, IR) solution concept. We obtain the same guarantees under the various weaker solution concepts and adapt our techniques to obtain (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanisms with the same guarantees for single-dimensional problems in time exponential in the number of players (Section 6.2). These are the first results for the PayM mechanismdesign problem for covering settings with correlated players under a notion stronger than (BIC, interim IR). To our knowledge, our results are new even for the simplest covering setting of single-item procurement auctions.
Our Techniques. The starting point for our construction is a linear-programming (LP) relaxation (P) for the problem of computing an optimal support-based-(IC, IR)-inexpectation mechanism. This was also the starting point in the work of Dobzinski et al. [2011] , which considers the revenue-maximization problem for CAs, but the covering nature of the problem makes it difficult to apply certain techniques utilized successfully in the context of packing problems (as described in the following text).
We show that an optimal solution to (P) can be computed given an optimal algorithm A for the CM problem, since A can be used to obtain a separation oracle for the dual LP. Next, we prove that a feasible solution to (P) can be extended to a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism with no larger objective value.
For single-dimensional problems, we show that even LP-relative ρ-approximation algorithms for the CM problem can be utilized, as follows. We move to a relaxation of (P), where we replace the set of allocations with the feasible region of the CM-LP. This can be solved efficiently, since the separation oracle for the dual can be obtained by optimizing over the feasible region of CM-LP, which can be done efficiently! But now we need to work harder to "round" an optimal solution (x, p) to the relaxation of (P) and obtain a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism. Here, we exploit the Lavi-Swamy [Lavi and Swamy 2011] convex-decomposition procedure, using which we can show (roughly speaking) that we can decompose ρx into a convex combination of allocations. This allows us to obtain a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism while blowing up the payment by a ρ-factor.
In comparison with the reduction in Dobzinski et al. [2011] , which is the work most closely related to ours, our reduction from support-based-IC mechanism design to the algorithmic CM problem is stronger in the following sense. For single-dimensional settings, it applies even with LP-relative approximation algorithms, and the approximation algorithm is required to work only for "proper inputs" with nonnegative costs. (Note that whereas for packing problems, allowing negative-value inputs can be benign, this can change the character of a covering problem considerably.) In contrast, Dobzinski et al. [2011] require an exact algorithm for the analogous social-welfaremaximization (SWM) problem.
Differences with Respect to Packing Problems. At a high level, our method of writing an LP for the underlying mechanism-design problem and solving it given an algorithm for an associated algorithmic problem is similar to the procedure in Dobzinski et al. [2011] . However, we encounter three distinct sources of difficulty when dealing with covering problems vis-a-vis packing problems.
First, as noted in Dobzinski et al. [2011] , the LP can only encode the IC and IR conditions for a finite set of type profiles, whereas, with an infinite type space, both support-based-(IC, IR) and (DSIC, IR) require the mechanism to satisfy the IC and IR conditions for an infinite set of type profiles. Therefore, to translate the LP solution to a suitable mechanism, we need to solve the "extension problem" of extending an allocation and pricing rule defined on a (finite) subset of the type space to the entire type space while preserving its IC and IR properties. This turns out to be a much more difficult task for covering problems than for packing domains. The key difference is that for a packing setting such as combinatorial auctions, one can show that any LP solution-in particular, the optimal LP solution-can be converted into a (DSICin-expectation, IR) mechanism without any loss in expected revenue (see Section C.1, in the Appendix). (Consequently, [Dobzinski et al. 2011 ] obtain (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanisms.) Intuitively, this works because one can focus on a single player by allocating no items to the other players. Clearly, one cannot mimic this for covering problems: dropping players may render the problem infeasible, and it is not clear how to extend an LP-solution to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for covering problems. We suspect that not every LP solution or support-based-(IC, IR) mechanism can be extended to a (DSIC, IR) mechanism and that there is a gap between the optimal expected total payments of support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) and (DSIC, IR) mechanisms. We leave these as open problems. 2 Due to this complication, we sacrifice a modicum of the IC, IR properties in favor of obtaining polytime near-optimal mechanisms and settle for the weaker, but still quite robust notion of support-based (IC-in-expectation, IR). We consider this to be a reasonable starting point for exploring mechanism-design solutions for covering problems, which leads to various interesting research directions. 3 A second difficulty, which we have alluded to, arises due to the fact that solving the LP requires one to solve the CM problem with negative-valued inputs. This is also true of packing problems [Dobzinski et al. 2011] (where one needs to solve the SWM problem), even in the single-item setting [Myerson 1981] (where reserve prices arise due to negative virtual valuations). While this is not a problem if we have an optimal algorithm for the CM problem, it creates serious issues, even in the single-dimensional setting, if we only have an approximation algorithm at hand; in particular, the standard notion of approximation becomes meaningless, since the optimum could be negative. In contrast, for packing problems with single-dimensional types (or additive types [Cai et al. 2012 [Cai et al. , 2013a [Cai et al. , 2013b ), these issues are more benign, since one may always discard players (or options of players) with negative value. In particular, an approximation algorithm can be used to obtain an approximate separation oracle for the dual LP, and thus obtain a near-optimal solution to the primal LP via a well-known technique in approximation algorithms. (We sketch this extension of a result of [Dobzinski et al. 2011] in Appendix C.1.)
Finally, a stunning aspect where covering and packing problems diverge can be seen when one considers the idea of a k-lookahead auction [Ronen 2001; Dobzinski et al. 2011 ]. This was used by Dobzinski et al. [2011] to convert their results in the explicit model to the oracle model introduced by Ronen [2001] . This however fails spectacularly in the covering setting. One can show that even for single-item procurement auctions, dropping even a single player can lead to an arbitrarily large payment compared to the optimum (see Appendix B).
Other Related Work. In the economics literature, the classical results of McLean [1985, 1988] and McAfee and Reny [1992] also apply to covering problems, and show that one can devise a (BIC, interim IR) mechanism with correlated players whose expected total payment is at most the expected total cost incurred provided the underlying type-distribution satisfies a certain full-rank assumption. These mechanisms may however cause a player to have negative utility under certain realizations of the random type profile.
The AMD literature has concentrated mostly on the independent-players setting [Cai et al. 2012 [Cai et al. , 2013a [Cai et al. , 2013b Alaei et al. 2012; Chawla et al. 2010; Hart and Nisan 2012] . There has been some, mostly recent, work that also considers correlated players [Ronen 2001; Ronen and Lehmann 2005; Dobzinski et al. 2011; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos 2011; Cai et al. 2012; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen 2013] . Much of this work pertains to the revenue-maximization setting; an exception is Ronen and Lehmann [2005] , which is discussed later. Ronen [2001] considers the single-item auction setting in the oracle model, where one samples from the distribution conditioned on some players' values. He proposes the (1-)lookahead auction and shows that it achieves a 1 2 -approximation. Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2011] show that the optimal (DSIC, IR) mechanism for the single-item auction can be computed efficiently with at most two players, and is NP otherwise. Cai et al. [2012] give a characterization of the optimal auction under certain settings. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] consider interdependent types, which generalizes the correlated type-distribution setting, and develop an analog of Myerson's theory for certain such settings. Ronen and Lehmann [2005] consider the PayM problem in the setting where a buyer wants to buy an item from sellers who can supply the item in one of many configurations and incur private costs for supplying the item. However, this procurement problem is in fact a packing problem: one can view a solution to be feasible if it selects at most one configuration for procurement; in particular, the buyer has the flexibility of not procuring the item. As noted earlier, this flexibility drastically alters the character of the mechanism-design problem. Not surprisingly, the results therein, which are based on lookahead auctions, do not apply in the covering setting (as already noted).
Various reductions from revenue-maximization to SWM are given in Cai et al. [2012 Cai et al. [ , 2013a Cai et al. [ , 2013b . The reductions in Cai et al. [2012 Cai et al. [ , 2013b also apply to covering problems and the PayM objective, but they are incomparable to our results. These works focus on the (BIC, interim-IR) solution concept, which is a rather weak/liberal notion for correlated distributions. Most (but not all) of these consider independent players and additive valuations and often require that the SWM-algorithm also work with negative values, which is a benign requirement for downward-closed environments such as CAs but is quite problematic for covering problems when it only has an approximation algorithm. Cai et al. [2012] consider correlated players and obtain mechanisms having running time polynomial in the maximum support-size of the marginal distribution of a player, which could be substantially smaller than the support-size of the entire distribution. This savings can be traced to the use of the (BIC, interim-IR) notion which allows Cai et al. [2012] to work with a compact description of the mechanism. It is unclear if these ideas are applicable when one considers robust-(BIC, IR) mechanisms.
A very interesting open question is whether one can design robust-(BIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanisms having running time polynomial in the support sizes of the marginal player distributions (as in [Cai et al. 2012; Dobzinski et al. 2011] ).
PRELIMINARIES
Covering Mechanism-Design Problems. We adopt the formulation in Minooei and Swamy [2012] to describe general covering mechanism-design problems. There are some items that need to be covered, and n players who provide covering objects. Let [k] denote the set {1, . . . , k}. Each player i provides a set T i of covering objects. All this information is public knowledge. Player i has a private cost or type vector
A feasible solution or allocation selects a subset T i ⊆ T i for each agent i, denoting that i provides the objects in T i , such that i T i covers all the items. Given this solution, each agent i incurs the private cost c i (T i ), and the mechanism designer incurs a publicly known cost pub(T 1 , . . . , T n ) ≥ 0, which may be used to encode any feasibility constraints in the covering problem.
Let C i denote the set of all possible types of agent i, and C = n i=1 C i . We assume (for notational simplicity) that C i = R
. . , T n ) : pub(T 1 , . . . , T n ) < ∞} be the (finite) set of all feasible allocations. For a tuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we use x −i to denote (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ). Similarly, let C −i = j =i C j . For an allocation ω = (T 1 , . . . , T n ), we sometimes use ω i to denote T i , c i (ω) to denote c i (ω i ) = c i (T i ), and pub(ω) to denote pub(T 1 , . . . , T n ). We make the mild assumption that pub(ω ) ≤ pub(ω) if ω i ⊆ ω i for all i; so in particular, if ω is feasible, then adding covering objects to the ω i s preserves feasibility.
A (direct revelation) mechanism M = (A, p 1 , . . . , p n ) for a covering problem consists of an allocation algorithm A : C → and a payment function p i : C → R for each agent i. Each agent i reports a cost function c i (that might be different from his true cost function). The mechanism computes the allocation A(c) = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) = ω ∈ , and pays p i (c) to each agent i. The utility u i (c i , c −i ; c i ) that player i derives when he reports c i and the others report c −i is p i (c)−c i (ω i ), where c i is his true cost function, and each agent i aims to maximize his own utility. We refer to max i |T i | as the dimension of a covering problem. Thus, for a single-dimensional problem, each player i's cost can be specified as c i 
This setup yields a multidimensional covering mechanism-design problem with additive types, where by additivity we mean that the private cost that a player i incurs for providing a set T ⊆ T i of objects is additive across the objects in
It is possible to define more general multidimensional settings, but additive types is a reasonable starting point to explore the multidimensional covering mechanism-design setting. (As noted earlier, there has been almost no work on designing polytime, near-optimal mechanisms for covering problems.)
The Bayesian Setting. We consider Bayesian settings where there is an underlying publicly-known discrete and possibly correlated joint type-distribution on C from which the players' types are drawn. We consider the so-called explicit model, where the players' type distribution is explicitly specified. We use D ⊆ C to denote the support of the type distribution and Pr D (c) to denote the probability of realization of c ∈ C. Also, we define
Solution Concepts. A mechanism sets up a game between players, and the solution concept dictates certain desirable properties that this game should satisfy so that one can reason about the outcome when rational players are presented with a mechanism satisfying the solution concept. The two chief properties that one seeks to capture relate to incentive compatibility (IC), which (roughly speaking) means that every agent's best interest is to reveal his type truthfully, and individual rationality (IR), which is the notion that no agent is harmed by participating in the mechanism. Differences and subtleties arise in Bayesian settings depending on the stage at which we impose these properties and how robust we would like these properties to be with respect to the underlying type distribution.
denotes the expectation over the other players' types conditioned on i's type being c i .
As mentioned earlier, the (BIC, interim-IR) solution concept may yet lead to ex-post "regret" and is quite nonrobust in the sense that the mechanism's IC and IR properties rely on having detailed knowledge of the distribution; thus, in order to be confident that a BIC mechanism achieves its intended functionality, one must be confident about the "correctness" of the underlying distribution, and learning this information might entail significant cost. To remedy these weaknesses, we propose and investigate the following stronger IC and IR notions.
Support-based (IC, IR) ensures that participating truthfully in the mechanism is in the best interest of every player even at the ex-post stage when he knows the realized types of all players. To ensure that support-based IC and support-based IR are compatible, we focus on monopoly-free settings: for every player i, there is some ω ∈ with ω i = ∅.
Notice that support-based (IC, IR) is subtly weaker than the notion of (dominantstrategy IC (DSIC), IR), wherein the IC and IR conditions of Definition 2.2 must hold for all c −i ∈ C −i , ensuring that truthtelling and participation are no-regret choices for a player even if the other players' reports are outside the support of the underlying type-distribution. We focus on support-based IC because it forms a suitable middleground between BIC and DSIC: it inherits the desirable robustness properties of DSIC, making it much more robust than BIC (and closer to a worst-case notion), and yet is flexible enough that one can devise polytime mechanisms satisfying this solution concept.
It might seem strange that in the definition of support-based (IC, IR), we consider player i's incentives for types outside of i's support and for type-profiles that are inconsistent with the underlying distribution. Keeping robustness in mind, our goal here is to approach the ideal of (DSIC, IR), and we have therefore formulated the most-robust notion that permits us to devise polytime near-optimal mechanisms satisfying this notion. In Section 6, we consider various alternate solution concepts that, while weaker than support-based (IC, IR), still retain its robustness properties to a large extent, and show that our results extend easily to these solution concepts.
The preceding definitions are stated for a deterministic mechanism, but they have analogous extensions to a randomized mechanism M; the only change is that the u i (.) and p i (.) terms are now replaced by the expected utility E M [u i (.)] and expected price E M [ p i (.)], respectively, where the expectation is over the random coin tosses of M. We denote the analogous solution concept for a randomized mechanism by appending "in expectation" to the solution concept, for example, a (BIC, interim IR)-in-expectation mechanism denotes a randomized mechanism whose expected utility satisfies the BIC and interim-IR requirements stated in Definition 2.1.
A support-based-(IC, IR)-in-expectation mechanism M = (A, { p i }) can be easily modified so that the IR condition holds with probability 1 (with respect to M's coin tosses) while the expected payment to a player (again over M's coin tosses) is unchanged: on input c, if A(c) = ω ∈ with probability q, the new mechanism returns, with probability q, the allocation ω, and payment
to each player i (where we take 0/0 to be 0, so if c i (ω) = 0, the payment to i is 0). Thus, we obtain a mechanism whose expected utility satisfies the support-based-IC condition, and IR holds with probability 1 for all
Optimization Problems. Our main consideration is to minimize the expected total payment of the mechanism. It is natural to also incorporate the mechanism-designer's cost into the objective. Define the disutility of a mechanism M = (A, { p i }) under input c to be i p i (c) + κ · pub(A(c)), where κ ≥ 0 is a given scaling factor. Our objective is to devise a polynomial-time support-based-(IC (in-expectation), IR)-mechanism with minimum expected disutility. Since most problems we consider have pub(ω) = 0 for all feasible allocations, in which case disutility equals the total payment; abusing terminology slightly, we refer to the preceding mechanism-design problem as the paymentminimization (PayM) problem. (An exception is metric uncapacitated facility location (UFL), where players provide facilities and the underlying metric is public knowledge; here, pub(ω) is the total client-assignment cost of the solution ω.) We always use O * to denote the expected disutility of an optimal mechanism for the PayM problem under consideration.
We define the cost minimization (CM) problem to be the algorithmic problem of finding ω ∈ that minimizes the total cost i c i (ω) + pub(ω) incurred.
The following technical lemma, whose proof we defer to Appendix A, will prove quite useful, since it allows us to restrict the domain to a bounded set, which is essential to achieving IR with finite prices. (E.g., in the single-dimensional setting, the payment is equal to the integral of a certain quantity from 0 to ∞, and a bounded domain ensures that this is well defined.) Note that such complications do not arise for packing problems. Let 1 T i be the |T i |-dimensional for all 1s vectors. Let I denote the input size. LEMMA 2.3. We can efficiently compute an estimate
It is easy to obtain the stated estimates if we consider only deterministic mechanisms, but it turns out to be tricky to obtain this when one allows randomized mechanisms due to the artifact that a randomized mechanism may choose arbitrarily high-cost solutions as long as they are chosen with small enough probability. In the sequel, we set
LP-RELAXATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT-MINIMIZATION PROBLEM
The starting point for our results is the LP (P) that essentially encodes the paymentminimization problem. Throughout, we use i to index players, c to index type-profiles in D, and ω to index . We use variables x c,ω to denote the probability of choosing ω, and p i,c to denote the expected payment to player i, for input c.
Constraint (1) encodes that an allocation is chosen for every c ∈ D, and Eqs. (2) and (3) encode the support-based-IC and support-based-IR conditions, respectively. Lemma 2.3 ensures that (P) correctly encodes PayM, so that OPT := OPT P is a lower bound on the expected disutility of an optimal mechanism. Our results are obtained by computing an optimal solution to (P), or a further relaxation of it, and translating this to a near-optimal support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism. Both steps come with their own challenges. Except in very simple settings (such as single-item procurement auctions), | | is typically exponential in the input size, and therefore it is not clear how to solve (P) efficiently. We therefore consider the dual LP (D), which has variables γ c ,
With additive types, one can encode the LHS of Eq. (5) as ic i (ω) for a suitablydefined additive type (depending on c)c i = (c i,v ) v∈T i . Thus, the separation problem for Constraint (5) amounts to determining if the optimal value of the CM problem defined by a certain additive type profile, with possibly negative values, is at least γ c . Hence, an optimal algorithm for the CM problem can be used to solve (D), and hence, (P), efficiently.
THEOREM 3.1. With additive types, one can efficiently solve (P) given an optimal algorithm for the CM problem.
PROOF. Let A be an optimal algorithm for the CM problem. Note that A is only required to work with nonnegative inputs. We first observe that we can use A to find a solution that minimizes i c i (ω) + κ · pub(ω) for any κ ≥ 0, even for an input
if ω * is an optimal solution, then A i ⊆ ω * i (since pub(.) does not increase upon adding covering objects). Define c + i,v 
where U is a strict upper bound on max ω∈ pub(ω) and N is an integer such that all the c + i,v s are integer multiples of 1 N . Note that for any ω, ω ∈ , if i c + i (ω) − i c + i (ω ) is nonzero, then its absolute value is at least 1 N . Also, U and N may be efficiently computed (for rational data) and log(NU ) is polynomially bounded. Let (S 1 , . . . , S n ) be the solution returned by A for the CM problem on the input, where all the c + i,v s are scaled by . The choice of ensures that
(The first inequality clearly holds if κ > 0. If κ = 0 and i c + i (S i 
, which contradicts the optimality of (S 1 , . . . , S n 
Given a dual solution (y, β, γ ), we can easily check if Eqs. (6), (7) hold. Fix c ∈ D and player i. Since we have additive types, if we define θ (5) for c can then be written as min ω∈ (c) ( i∈I θ c (ω) + κ Pr D (c) pub(ω)) ≥ γ c . Definec as follows:
It is easy to see that Eq. (5) holds for c if and only if min ω∈ ( ic i (ω)+κ ·Pr D (c) pub(ω))which can be computed using A-is at least γ c . Thus, we can use the ellipsoid method to solve (D). This also yields a compact dual consisting of Constraints (6), (7) and the polynomially-many Constraints (5) that were returned by the separation oracle during the execution of the ellipsoid method, whose optimal value is OPT D . The dual of this compact dual is an LP of the same form as (P) but with polynomially-many x c,ω -variables; solving this yields an optimal solution to (P).
Complementing Theorem 3.1, we argue that a feasible solution (x, p) to (P) can be extended to a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism having expected disutility at most the value of (x, p) (Theorem 3.2). Combining this with Theorem 3.1 yields the corollary that an optimal algorithm for the CM problem can be used to obtain an optimal mechanism for the PayM problem (Corollary 3.3).
THEOREM 3.2. We can extend a feasible solution (x, p) to (P) to a supportbased-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism with expected disutility c Pr D (c) ( i 
is well defined by the preceding argument).
We now define the randomized mechanism M = (A, {q i }), where A(c) and q i (c) denote, respectively, the probability distribution over allocations and the expected payment to player i, on input c. We sometimes view A(c) equivalently as the random variable specifying the allocation chosen for input c. Fix an allocation ω 0 ∈ . Consider an input c. If c ∈ D, we set A(c) = x c , and q i (c) = p i,c for all i. So consider c / ∈ D. If there is no i such that c −i ∈ D −i , we simply set A(c) = ω 0 , q i (c) = c i (ω 0 ) for all i; such a c does not figure in the support-based (IC, IR) conditions. Otherwise, there is a unique i such that
Thus, by definition, and by Eq. (2), we have ensured that M is support-based (IC, IR)-in-expectation and its expected disutility is exactly the value of (x, p). This can be modified so that IR holds with probability 1.
This procedure is efficient if ω∈ c i (ω)x c,ω can be calculated efficiently. This is clearly true if | | is polynomially bounded, but it could hold under weaker conditions as well.
COROLLARY 3.3. Given an optimal algorithm for the CM problem, we can efficiently obtain an optimal support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for the PayM problem in multidimensional settings with additive types.
Using Approximation Algorithms. The CM problem is however often NP-hard (e.g., for vertex cover), and we would like to be able to exploit approximation algorithms for the CM problem to obtain near-optimal mechanisms. The usual approach is to use an approximation algorithm to "approximately" separate over Constraint (5). 4 However, this does not work here, since the CM problem that one needs to solve in the separation problem involves negative costs, which renders the usual notion of approximation meaningless. Instead, if the CM problem admits a certain type of LP-relaxation (C-P), then we argue that one can solve a relaxation of (P) where the allocation set is the set of extreme points of (C-P) (Theorem 3.4). For single-dimensional problems (Section 4), we leverage this to obtain strong and far-reaching results. We show that a ρ-approximation algorithm relative to (C-P) can be used to "round" the optimal solution to this relaxation to a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR)-mechanism losing a ρ-factor in the disutility (Theorem 4.2). Thus, we obtain near-optimal mechanisms for a variety of single-dimensional problems.
Suppose that the CM problem admits an LP-relaxation of the following form, where
Intuitively x encodes the allocation chosen, and d T z encodes pub (.) . For
We require the following. an optimal solution, it has one where x ∈ LP . (d) For any c, we can efficiently find an optimal solution to (C-P) or detect that it is unbounded or infeasible.
We extend the type c i of each player i and pub to assign values also to points in LP : define c i (x) = v∈T i c i,v x i,v and pub(x) = d T z(x) for x ∈ LP . Let ext denote the finite set of extreme points of LP . Condition (a) ensures that ext contains the characteristic vectors of all feasible allocations. Let (P') denote the relaxation of (P), where we replace the set of feasible allocations with ext (so ω indexes ext now), and for c ∈ D with c i = m i 1(T i ), we now define (c) := {ω ∈ ext : ω i,v = 0 ∀v ∈ T i }. Since one can optimize efficiently over LP , and hence ext , even for negative type-profiles, we have the following. THEOREM 3.4. We can efficiently compute an optimal solution to (P').
SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS
Corollary 3.3 immediately yields results for certain single-dimensional problems (see Table I ), most notably, single-item procurement auctions. We now substantially expand the scope of PayM problems for which one can obtain near-optimal mechanisms by showing how to leverage "LP-relative" approximation algorithms for the CM problem. (As noted earlier, and sketched in Appendix C.1, a simpler approach can be used to leverage approximation algorithms for revenue-maximization in packing domains.)
Suppose that the CM problem can be encoded as (C-P). An LP-relative ρ-approximation algorithm for the CM problem is a polytime algorithm that for any input c ≥ 0 to the covering problem, returns a {0, 1}-vector x ∈ LP such that c T x + d T z(x) ≤ ρOPT C-P . Using the convex-decomposition procedure in Lavi and Swamy [2011, Section 5 .1], one can show the following; the proof appears at the end of this section.
LEMMA 4.1. Let x ∈ LP . Given an LP-relative ρ-approximation algorithm A for the CM problem, one can efficiently obtain (λ (1) , x (1) ), . . . , (λ (k) 
THEOREM 4.2. Given an LP-relative ρ-approximation algorithm for the CM problem, one can obtain a polytime ρ-approximation support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for the PayM problem.
PROOF. We solve (P') to obtain an optimal solution (x, p). Since |T i | = 1 for all i, it will be convenient to view ω ∈ LP as a vector
Define y c = ω∈ ext x c,ω ω (which can be efficiently computed since x has polynomial support). Then, ω∈ ext c i (ω)x c,ω = c i y c,i and d T z(y) ≤ ω∈ ext pub(ω)x c,ω . By Lemma 4.1, we can efficiently find a pointỹ c = ω∈ x c,ω ω, wherex c ≥ 0, w∈ x c,ω = 1, in the convex hull of the {0, 1}-vectors in LP such thatỹ c,i = min(ρy c,i , 1) for all i, and w∈ x c,ω pub(ω) ≤ ρd T z(y).
We now argue that one can obtain payments {q i,c } such that (x, q) is feasible to (P) and q i,c ≤ ρp i,c for all i, c ∈ D. Thus, the value of (x, q) is at most ρ times the value of (x, p). Applying Theorem 3.2 to (x, q) yields the desired result.
Fix i and c −i ∈ D −i . Constraints (4) and (2) ensure that y (m i ,c −i ),i = 0, and y
(3) holds. By construction, for consecutive values Table I summarizes a few applications. Even for single-item procurement auctions, these are the first results for PayM problems with correlated players satisfying a notion stronger than (BIC, interim IR). PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1. Define y i,v = min(ρx i,v , 1) for all i, v ∈ T i . It suffices to show that the LP (Q) can be solved in polytime and its optimal value is 1. Throughout, we use to index {0, 1} vectors in LP . (Recall that these correspond to feasible allocations.) 
Here, the α s, β, and θ are the dual variables corresponding to Constraints (8), (9), and (10), respectively. Clearly, OPT (R) ≤ 1, since θ = 1, α i,v = 0 = β for all i, v is a feasible dual solution.
Suppose (α,β,θ ) is a feasible dual solution of value less than 1.
N . Note that we can choose N so that its size is poly(I, size of x). Consider the CM problem defined by the input α. Running A on this input, we obtain a {0, 1}-vector x ( ) ∈ LP whose total cost is at most ρ times the cost of the fractional solution (x, z(x) ). This translates to
Now augment x ( ) to the following {0, 1}-vectorx:
Thenx is the characteristic vector of a feasible allocation, since we have only added covering objects to the allocation corresponding to x ( ) ; hencex ∈ LP . We have d T z(x) = pub(x) ≤ pub(x ( ) ) = d T (z(x )) and i,vx i,vαi,v 
Combined with Eq. (12), this shows that i,vx i,vαi,v 
which contradicts that (α,β,θ ) is feasible to (R). Hence, OPT (Q) = OPT (R) = 1. Thus, we can add the constraint i,v∈T i min(ρx i,v , 1)α i,v + ρd T z(x) · β + θ ≤ 1 to (R) without altering anything. If we solve the resulting LP using the ellipsoid method and take the inequalities corresponding to the violated Inequality (11) found by A during the ellipsoid method, then we obtain a compact LP with only a polynomial number of constraints that is equivalent to (R). The dual of this compact LP yields an LP equivalent to (Q) with a polynomial number of λ ( ) variables which we can solve to obtain the desired convex decomposition.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS
We obtain results for multidimensional PayM problems via two distinct approaches. One is by directly applying Corollary 3.3 (e.g., Theorem 5.1). The other approach is based on again moving to an LP-relaxation of the CM problem and utilizing Theorem 3.4 in conjunction with a stronger LP-rounding approach. This yields results for multidimensional (metric) UFL and its variants (Theorem 5.3).
Multi-Item Procurement Auctions. Here, we have n sellers and k (heterogeneous) items. Each seller i has a supply vector s i ∈ Z k + denoting his supply for the various items, and the buyer has a demand vector d ∈ Z k + specifying his demand for the various items. This is public knowledge. Each seller i has a private cost-vector c i ∈ R k + , where c i, is the cost he incurs for supplying one unit of item . A feasible solution is an allocation specifying how many units of each item each seller supplies to the buyer such that for each item , each seller i provides at most s i, units of and the buyer obtains d total units of . The corresponding CM problem is a min-cost flow problem (in a bipartite graph), which can be efficiently solved optimally, thus we obtain a polytime optimal mechanism. THEOREM 5.1. There is a polytime optimal support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for multi-unit procurement auctions.
Multidimensional Budgeted (Metric) Uncapacitated Facility Location (UFL). Here, we have a set E of clients that need to be serviced by facilities and a set F of locations where facilities may be opened. Each player i may provide facilities at the locations in T i ⊆ F. We may assume that the T i s are disjoint. For each facility ∈ T i that is opened, i incurs a private opening cost f ≡ f i, , and assigning client j to an open facility incurs a publicly-known assignment cost d j , where the d j s form a metric. We are also given a public assignment-cost budget B. The goal in Budget-UFL is to open a subset F ⊆ F of facilities and assign each client j to an open facility σ ( j) ∈ F so as to minimize
We can define pub(T 1 , . . . , T n ) to be the total assignment cost if this is at most B, and ∞ otherwise.
Let O * denote the expected disutility of an optimal mechanism for Budget-UFL. We obtain a mechanism with expected disutility at most 2O * that always returns a solution with expected assignment cost at most 2B. Consider the following LP-relaxation for Budget-UFL.
Let (FL-P) denote (BFL-P) with B = ∞, and OPT FL-P denote its optimal value. We say that an algorithm A is a Lagrangian multiplier preserving (LMP) ρ-approximation algorithm for UFL if, for every instance, it returns a solution (F, σ ) such that ρ ∈F f + j∈E d σ ( j) j ≤ ρ · OPT FL-P . Minooei and Swamy [2012] show that given such an algorithm A, one can take any solution (x, z) to (FL-P) and obtain a convex combination of UFL solutions (λ (1) ; F (1) , σ (1) ), . . . , (λ (k) ; F (k) , σ (k) )-so λ ≥ 0, r λ (r) = 1such that r: ∈F (r) λ (r) = x for all and r λ (r) ( j d σ (r) ( j) j ) ≤ ρ j, d j z j . An LMP 2-approximation algorithm for UFL is known [Jain et al. 2003b ].
LEMMA 5.2. Given an LMP ρ-approximation algorithm for UFL, one can design a polytime support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for Budget-UFL whose expected disutility is at most ρ O * while violating the budget by at most a ρ-factor.
PROOF. The LP-relaxation (BFL-P) for the CM problem is of the form (C-P) and satisfies the required properties. Recall that for x ≥ 0, z(x) denotes the min-cost completion of x to a feasible solution to (BFL-P) if one exists, and is ⊥ if there is no such completion of x. Let LP := {x : z(x) = ⊥, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ∀ }. For integral ω ∈ LP , z(ω) specifies the assignment where each client j is assigned to the nearest open facility. By Theorem 3.4, one can efficiently compute an optimal solution (X, p) to the relaxation of (P) where the set of feasible allocations is the set ext of extreme points of LP .
We round (X, p) to a feasible solution to (P) by proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Let UFL be the set of characteristic vectors of open facilities of all integral UFL solutions. We use to index facilities in F and j to index clients in E. Fix c ∈ D. Define y c = ω∈ ext X c,ω ω, so w∈ ext c i (ω)X c,ω = ∈T i f y c, . Let z c = ω∈ ext X c,ω z(ω), so j, z c, j d j ≤ B. We use the LMP ρ-approximation algorithm to express y c as a convex combination ω∈ UFLx c,ω ω of (integral) UFL-solutions such that the expected assignment cost ω∈ UFLx c,ω j, z(ω) j d j is at most ρ j, d j z c, j ≤ ρ B. Hence, (x, p) is a feasible solution to (P). Theorem 3.2 now yields the desired mechanism. THEOREM 5.3. There is a polytime support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for Budget-UFL with expected disutility at most 2O * , which always returns a solution with expected assignment cost at most 2B.
EXTENSIONS: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION CONCEPTS
We now investigate the PayM problem under various alternative solution concepts. In Section 6.1, we consider solution concepts weaker than support-based (IC, IR) yet robust enough to ensure that truthful participation is an ex-post no-regret choice for every player at every type profile in the support of the underlying distribution. We show that all our guarantees extend readily to these solution concepts. (Note that a weaker solution concept does not necessarily mean that the corresponding PayM mechanism-design problem is a simpler problem; a weaker solution concept enlarges the space of allowed mechanisms, which could make it more or less difficult to search for an optimal mechanism.) In Section 6.2, we consider the stronger solution concept of (DSIC (in-expectation), IR) and obtain results for single-dimensional settings but at the expense of increasing the running time to exponential in the number of players.
Solution Concepts Weaker than Support-Based (IC, IR)
Consider the following weakenings of support-based (IC, IR) (Definition 2.2).
For every player i,
All three solution concepts, Eqs. (13)-(15), ensure that truthful participation is in the best interest of every player i at every type-profile in D, even at the ex-post stage when he knows the realized types of all players, but for varying choices of lies: in Eq. (14), the lie could be anything, so a mechanism satisfying Eq. (14) is (BIC, interim IR) for every distribution whose support is contained in D; in Eq. (15), the "best interest" is among lies consistent with i's support; and in Eq. (13), the "best interest" is among lies consistent with the support of the distribution.
We now argue that our results extend to these notions. For Notions (13) and (15), one can simply incorporate all the IC and IR constraints in the LP. Note that there are O(n|D| 2 ) such constraints under Eq. (13), and O(n|D| 3 ) constraints under Eq. (15), so the size of the resulting LP is poly(n, |D|). Theorem 3.1 continues to hold for the resulting LP, due to the same arguments. For both notions, an LP solution immediately yields a randomized mechanism satisfying that notion, except that utility is replaced by expected utility; for type profiles not included in the LP, we may output any outcome ω 0 (and any prices). The refinements for single-dimensional settings and multidimensional FL work in the same fashion as before: the appropriate LP (e.g., (P')) is modified to include the appropriate set of IC and IR constraints and solved as before. The rounding of an LP solution to obtain a suitable mechanism proceeds as before. Consequently, all of our results extend to these two notions with minimal effort.
For Notion (14), we incorporate constraints but restrict c i to lie in D i . Recall that
We also include Constraint (4) as before. Again, the resulting LP can be solved given an optimal algorithm for the CM problem. The LP solution can be extended to a mechanism exactly as in Theorem 3.2, and it is easy to see that this extension satisfies Eq. (14). Therefore, all our results extend to this notion as well.
Dominant-Strategy IC Mechanisms
We can strengthen our results from Section 4 to obtain (near-)optimal dominantstrategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms for single-dimensional problems in time exponential in n. Thus, we obtain polytime mechanisms for any constant number of players.
The key change is in the LP (P) (or (P')), where we now enforce Eqs.
(1)-(4) for every player i and every type profile in i D i . (Note that, as before, we can only enforce IC and IR constraints for a finite set of type profiles.) Theorem 3.1, as also the rounding procedure and arguments in Theorem 4.2 proceed essentially identically to yield a nearoptimal solution to this LP. We prove that in single-dimensional settings, enforcing the IC, IR constraints for the set i D i of type profiles enables one to extend the LP solution to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism without increasing the expected disutility. Thus, we obtain the same guarantees as in Table I , but under the stronger solution concept of (DSIC-in-expectation, IR).
We focus on single-dimensional settings here, because, at various places, our arguments rely on the well-known equivalence between monotonic allocation rules and DSIC-implementable allocation rules. We do not know if a similar result holds for multidimensional settings. This and various other unanswered questions emerge from our result; we mention a few of these next before delving into our construction for single-dimensional settings.
(a) In multidimensional settings, what finite subsets C ⊆ C of the type space have the property that enforcing the IC and IR constraints for every player i and every type profile in C suffices to extend an LP solution to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR mechanism)? (b) Does C = i D i have this extension property (as is the case in single-dimensional settings)? (c) Is there some C of size poly(n, |D|) with this extension property?
We now describe briefly the changes required to obtain (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanisms. Analogous to Lemma 2.3, we can obtain estimates m i such that there is an optimal mechanism M * such that on any input c ∈ i (D i ∪ {m i }), where c i < m i for at least one i, M * only buys the item with nonzero probability from a player i with c i < m i (the same proof approach works). Let D := i D i and D −i := j =i D j ; also, let
if there is some i such that c i < m i , and otherwise. In our LP (P), or its relaxation (P') (where we move to an LP-relaxation of the CM problem and consider the allocation-set ext ), we now enforce Eqs. (1)
Let (K-P) and (K-P') (with allocation-set LP ) denote these new LPs. When n is a constant, both LPs have a polynomial number of constraints. So again by considering the dual, we can efficiently compute (i) an optimal solution to (K-P) given an optimal algorithm for the CM problem; and (ii) an optimal solution to (K-P'). If the CM problem can be encoded via (C-P) and we have an LP-relative approximation algorithm for the CM problem, then one can use the rounding procedure described in Theorem 4.2 to round the optimal solution to (K-P') to a near-optimal solution to (K-P); the arguments are essentially identical.
So suppose that we have a near-optimal solution (x, p) to (K-P). We extend (x, p) to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism M = (A, {q i }) without increasing the expected disutility. Here, A(c) and q i (c) denote as before the allocation-distribution and expected payment to i, on input c.
Define y c = ω x c,ω ω, where we treat ω as a vector in {0, 1} n with 
THEOREM 6.1. For single-dimensional problems with a constant number of players, we obtain the same guarantees as in Table I , but under the stronger solution concept of DSIC-in-expectation and IR. have ω i = ∅, then we also haveq i,(c i ,c −i ) =q i,(c i ,c −i ) = 0 by our earlier claim, so the RHS of Eq. (17) is 0, and Eq. (17) holds. Otherwise, we have ω c i 
, so the RHS of Eq. (17) is at most 0, and Eq. (17) holds.
Thus, we have shown that (x,q) is a feasible solution to (P). Now we can apply Theorem 3.2 to extend (x,q) and obtain a support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism M * whose expected disutility is at most c
,ω > 0 implies that ω i = ∅ for all i, M * satisfies the required conditions.
B. INFERIORITY OF k-LOOKAHEAD PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
The following k-lookahead auction was proposed by Dobzinski et al. [2011] for the single-item revenue-maximization problem generalizing the 1-lookahead auction considered by Ronen [2001] and Ronen and Saberi [2002] : on input v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), pick the set I of k players with highest values and run the revenue-maximizing (DSIC, IR) mechanism for player-set I, where the distribution we use for I is the conditional distribution of the values for I given the values (v i ) i / ∈I for the other players. Dobzinski et al. [2011] show that the k-lookahead auction achieves a constant-fraction of the revenue of the optimal (DSIC, IR) mechanism.
For any k ≥ 2, we can consider an analogous definition of k-lookahead auction for the single-item procurement problem: on input c, we pick the set I of k players with smallest costs and run the payment-minimizing support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for I for the conditional distribution of I's costs given (c i ) i / ∈I . We call this the k-lookahead procurement auction. The following example shows that the expected total payment of the k-lookahead procurement auction can be arbitrarily large, even when k = n − 1 (i.e., we drop only one player), and compared to the optimal expected total payment of even a deterministic (DSIC, IR) mechanism.
Let t = K + , where > 0, and δ > 0. The distribution D consists of n points: each c in {c : c n = t, ∃i ∈ [n − 1] s.t. c i = 0, c j = K ∀ j = i, n} has probability Pr D (c) = 1−δ n−1 , and the type-profile c, where c i = K ∀i = n, c n = t has probability Pr D (c) = δ.
Let k = n− 1. The k-lookahead procurement auction will always select the player-set I = {1, . . . , n − 1}, and the conditional distribution of values of players in I is simply D. Let M be the support-based-(IC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism for the players in I under this conditional distribution D. Suppose that on input (K, K, . . . , K, t) , the klookahead auction (which runs M ) buys the item from player i ∈ I with probability x i . Clearly, i∈I x i = 1. Then, on the inputc, wherec i = 0,c j = K for all j = i, n,c n = t, the mechanism must also buy the item from player i with probability at least x i since M is support-based IC. So since M is support-based (IC-in-expectation, IR), the payment to player i under inputc is at least K, and therefore the expected total payment of the k-lookahead auction is at least K( i∈I x i ) · 1−δ n−1 = K(1−δ) n−1 . Now consider the following mechanism M = (A, { p i }). Consider input c. If some player i < n has c i = 0, M buys the item from such a player i (breaking ties in some fixed way). Otherwise, if c n ≤ t, M buys from player n; else, M buys from the player i with smallest c i . It is easy to verify that for every i and c −i , this allocation rule A is monotonically decreasing in c i . Let p i (c) = 0 if M does not buy the item from i on input c, and max{z : M buys the item from i on input (z, c −i )} otherwise. By a well-known fact, (see, e.g., Theorem 9.39 in Nisam et al. [2007] ), M is DSIC and IR. Then, the total payment under any c ∈ D for which c i = 0 for some i, is 0, and the total payment under the input where c i = K for all i = n, c n = t is t. So the expected total payment of M is tδ.
Thus the ratio of the expected total payments of M and M is at least K(1−δ) tδ(n−1) , which can be made arbitrarily large by choosing δ and = t − K small enough.
Our study of PayM problems also leads to some interesting insights into the revenuemaximization problem in packing settings with correlated players. We state two results that are obtained via relatively-simple observations, but we believe are nevertheless of interest.
In Section C.1, we justify our comment in the Introduction that the problem of extending an LP solution to a suitable mechanism becomes much easier in a packing setting such as combinatorial auctions (CAs). We show that any solution to an LPrelaxation similar to (P) for the revenue-maximization problem in CAs can be extended to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism without any loss in revenue. In Section C.2, we obtain a noteworthy extension of a result in Dobzinski et al. [2011] . We show that in single-dimensional packing settings, a ρ-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem can be used to obtain a ρ-approximation (DSIC-in-expectation, IR)-mechanism for the revenue-maximization problem. We obtain this by noting that a ρ-approximation for the SWM problem can be used to obtain a ρ-approximate separation oracle for the dual of the revenue-maximization LP, despite the fact that the separation problem is an SWM problem possibly involving negative-valued inputs 5 , which then yields, in a fairly-standard way, a ρ-approximate solution to the revenue-maximization LP.
C.1. Extending LP Solutions to (DSIC-in-Expectation, IR) Mechanisms
We consider the prototypical problem of combinatorial auctions; similar arguments can be made for other packing domains. In CAs, a feasible allocation ω is one that allots a disjoint set ω i of items (which could be empty) to each player i, and player i's value under allocation ω is v i (ω i ), where v i : 2 [m] → R + is player i's private valuation function. We use v i (ω) to denote v i (ω i ). Let V i denote the set of all private types of player i, and V −i = j =i V j . As before, let be the set of all feasible solutions.
We consider the following LP along the lines of (P). Since we are in a packing setting, we do not need the m i estimates. We may assume that each D i contains the valuation 0 i , where 0 i (ω) = 0 for all ω, since if not, we can just add this to D i , and set Pr D (0 
The above LP-relaxation is similar to the LP in Dobzinski et al. [2011] for singledimensional packing problems. For CAs, the LP in Dobzinski et al. [2011] is subtly different from (R-P): their allocation variables encode the probability that a player i receives a set S of items. If we let the allocation space in (R-P) be the set ext of extreme points of the standard LP-relaxation for the CA problem, then our formulations coincide since a feasible solution to the standard LP specifies the extent to which each player receives each set. (Note that the convex-decomposition technique in [Lavi and Swamy 2011] directly implies that an integrality-gap verifying ρ-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem can be used to decompose the fractional allocation specified by the LP in [Dobzinski et al. 2011] scaled by ρ into a distribution over , and thereby obtain a solution to (R-P).)
Let (x,p) be a solution to (R-P). We convert (x,p) to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism M = (A, {q i }) with no smaller expected total revenue. Here, A(v) and q i (v) are the allocation-distribution and expected price of player i on input v. Since any support-based-(IC, IR)-in-expectation mechanism yields a feasible solution to (R-P), this also shows that any support-based-(IC, IR)-in-expectation mechanism for CAs can be extended to a (DSIC-in-expectation, IR) mechanism without any loss in revenue.
Our argument is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 3.2, but the packing nature of the problem simplifies things significantly. We may assume that all constraints in Eq. (20) are tight; otherwise, if there is some v ∈ D with ω∈ x v,ω < 1, then letting ω 0 be allocation, where ω 0 i = ∅ for all i, we can increasex v,ω 0 to make this sum 1 without affecting feasibility.
First, we set A(v) =x v , q i (v) =p i,v for all v ∈ D and all i, so it is clear that the expected total revenue of M is the value of (x,p).
If |{i : v i / ∈ D i }| ≥ 2, then we give everyone the empty-set and charge everyone 0. Otherwise, suppose (i) =x (v (i) ,v −i ) . For ω ∈ , let proj i (ω) denote the allocation where player i receives ω i ⊆ [m], and the other players receive ∅. Viewing A(v) as the random variable specifying the allocation selected, we set A(v) = proj i (ω) with probabilityȳ (i) ω . We set q i (v) =p i,(v (i) ,v −i ) . Since 0
To see that M is DSIC in expectation, consider some
∈ D −i , then player i always receives the empty set and pays 0. Otherwise, we have ensured by definition that player i does not benefit by lying.
C.2. Utilizing Approximation Algorithms for the SWM Problem
We briefly sketch how to utilize a ρ-approximation algorithm for the SWM problem to obtain a ρ-approximation (DSIC-in-expectation, IR)-mechanism for the revenuemaximization problem in single-dimensional settings. Similar arguments apply to packing settings with additive types.
Consider again the LP (R-P). For all i, ω, we now have v i (ω) = v i α i,ω , where v i ∈ R is i's private type and α i,ω ≥ 0 is public knowledge. This is identical to the LP in Dobzinski et al. [2011] for single-parameter revenue-maximization problems. It will be convenient to view ω ∈ as the vector {α i,ω } i∈[n] ∈ R n + . Since we are in a packing setting, is downward closed, so ω ∈ and ω ≤ ω implies that ω ∈ . The dual of (R-P) is
∀i, v ∈ D (23) y, β, γ ≥ 0.
